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Executive summary
As Commission President Ursula von der Leyen 
prepares her State of the Union speech that will map 
out the second half of her mandate, she must seize the 
opportunity to reset her Commission after more than  
18 months in crisis-fighting mode. 
In broad lines, the European Commission’s priorities – 
fostering a collective recovery from the pandemic; rolling 
out Europe’s green, digital and geopolitical makeover – 
are the right ones. But today’s pace of change requires an 
updated outlook, fresh ideas and a critical examination 
of the President’s leadership, methods and structures. 
The following three essential questions guide a reflection 
on what this Commission now stands for:
1.   How does the Commission ensure a continued 
capacity for fresh thinking and renewal to direct  
the EU’s political agenda? 
2.   Can the EU deal with the political fall-out from 
uncertainty, shocks and change?
3.   Is the Commission’s executive structure tailored  
to deliver the major tasks it faces? 
With many strong personalities and seasoned politicians, 
von der Leyen’s Commission has potential, and yet much 
of its agenda remains undelivered. Now is the time for her 
administration to regroup and get things done in the final 
three years of her term. The below five recommendations 
addressed to President von der Leyen outline what should 
be done to improve her leadership and administration’s 
delivery within the current legal and institutional 
framework and complete the mandate assigned to her  
by Europe’s leaders and the European Parliament:
1.   Establish independent thought and foresight, 
capable of challenging established ideas and 
structures, at the heart of the Commission’s 
leadership and policy agenda. ‘New’ key policy 
questions that von der Leyen should address 
in her State of the Union speech range from 
climate adaptation, demography and migration to 
investment in skills, tech, defence; and engaging 
Europeans in democratic renewal.
2.   Clarify responsibilities over priority deliveries in 
the next three years within the College, including 
her own working relationship and shared leadership 
with the (Executive) Vice-Presidents. Commissioners’ 
groups should be streamlined according to (new) 
priorities, and Commissioners should receive updated 
mission letters. 
3.   Rethink the inter-institutional cooperation on 
major transformative EU projects, such as the 
Green Deal and digital transition, which must be 
co-constructed across institutions, from inception 
to adoption, through dedicated structures and 
processes. The Green Deal has so far been a missed 
opportunity in this regard. To better process member 
states’ political concerns, von der Leyen and Council 
President Charles Michel should offer First Vice-
President Frans Timmermans a ‘Barnier seat’ at the 
European Council. Timmermans should then embark 
on an intensive ‘capital city’ tour with key staff and 
initiate an informal ‘Green Deal delivery task force’ 
with the upcoming Council Presidencies  
and European Parliament. 
4.   Experiment further with the task force model, 
relying on the dual leadership of a politician and  
a high-level civil servant that are given direct access 
to top staff and resources across the Commission to 
solve a specific mission. Climate adaption, alternative 
strategies of decarbonisation (e.g. carbon capture and 
removal technologies), the development of European 
tech ecosystems, and even EU–China relations could 
be compelling case studies for experimentation.
5.   Provide immediate remedy to resource allocation 
problems in overburdened Directorates-General 
and enact a proper reform of staffing policies. 
Reforming outdated pay and privileges structures 
within the EU’s civil service stands as a necessary 
trade-off for member states to understand the 
resource needs of a growing Commission. 
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Introduction
From geopolitics to COVID-19 and the impacts of climate 
change, historical changes across the world have filled 
our newsfeeds over the past months. Europe, too, is in 
movement – albeit at a slower pace. Running Europe’s 
‘big government’, the European Commission, is not easy. 
Effective leadership and government depend on catching 
tides and finding a common direction for the 27 member 
states rather than drifting along with current events. 
For all the pointed (and often justified) criticism 
Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has received, 
she also deserves praise for devising new initiatives and 
steadying the ship during the pandemic. Her Commission 
had not been in office for even a hundred days when a 
crisis no one could imagine hit. Although she did not 
personally originate the the COVID-19 recovery fund, the 
European Green Deal, or the EU’s Emergency Response 
Coordination Centre that fought the wildfires and floods 
this summer, she does oversee it all. 
Now, as she approaches the mid-mandate mark and 
Europe slowly emerges from the most critical phase  
of the pandemic, she must consider what to do more,  
and better. As for any government, the end of a phase is 
also the moment to reset for the next. “The future will be  
what we make it. And Europe will be what we want it to 
be”, she confidently asserts on Commission webpages 
announcing her upcoming State of the Union address  
on 15 September.1 
 
In broad lines, the Commission’s priorities – fostering 
a collective recovery from the pandemic; focusing on 
Europe’s green, digital and geopolitical makeover – are  
the right ones.2 Having already bitten more than it 
can chew, the Commission’s focus must now not 
be on devising new grand initiatives but rather on 
implementing what has been started.3 However today’s 
pace of change also requires an updated outlook, fresh 
ideas and a critical self-examination of her leadership, 
methods and structures. The following three questions 
guide this reflection:
1.  How does the Commission ensure a continued 
capacity for fresh thinking and renewal to direct the 
EU’s political agenda? 
2.  Can the EU deal with the political fall-out from 
uncertainty, shocks and change?
3.  Is the Commission’s executive structure tailored to 
deliver the major tasks it faces? 
Finally, five recommendations addressed to President 
von der Leyen outline what should be done to improve 
her leadership and administration within the legal and 
institutional framework set by the current treaties and 
complete the mandate assigned to her by Europe’s leaders 
and the European Parliament.
How does the Commission make fresh thinking  
and renewal permanent features in directing  
the EU’s political agenda? 
Some years back, Dutch Prime Minister and ultra-pragmatist 
Mark Rutte proposed, presumably humorously, that fellow 
European leaders seeking vision should “visit an optician”.4 
In a hierarchical organisation like the 
European Commission, ensuring a 
continued capacity for fresh thinking and 
renewal falls on the top leadership. But in 
this case, it is unclear whether the current 
structures are up to this task.
Yet, in today’s innovation-driven world, Europe will not 
prosper without bold ideas and a compass that provides 
a sense of direction. Complacency, risk-averseness 
and resistance to change – often commonplace in 
public administrations – are all synonymous with our 
relative decline. In a hierarchical organisation like the 
Commission, ensuring a continued capacity for fresh 
thinking and renewal falls on the top leadership. But in 
this case, it is unclear whether the current structures are 
up to this task. 
Looking back on the last two decades of European 
policymaking, there are few standout cases of bold, 
determined bets on technology and future European 
capabilities. The Galileo space programme is one rare 
example. In retrospect, public investment in a European 
global positioning system should have been a no-brainer 
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alternative when attempts at a public-private partnership 
broke down (because of calculation errors!). However, 
the fate of the programme hinged on the tenacity of only 
a few individuals, led by then Commissioner Loyola de 
Palacio. The US arm-twisted the Europeans so much that 
the Commission announced, “Galileo is almost dead”.5 
Today, over 2.2 billion smartphones are Galileo-enabled, 
and its services are used in everything from modern 
farming to the Internet of Things.6
Europe is facing a new geopolitics that draws us into 
a tech marathon with the US and China of an entirely 
different scale.7 We must either throw down the gauntlet 
or accept our waning position and face an increasingly 
uncomfortable squeeze in the middle. A decisive factor 
will be the Commission’s level of impetus over the 
next three years – or lack thereof. Internal Market 
Commissioner Thierry Breton seems determined to push 
forward an investment agenda for European technology 
ecosystems and autonomous capacities. But it will mostly 
depend on buy-in from across the rest of the Commission 
and member states amid a difficult balancing act with 
Europe’s open trade and transatlantic agendas. 
Ultimately, the challenge lies in how we anticipate and 
prepare for the future. It is not the Commission President’s 
role to understand all the parameters of a changing world 
and ask ‘what if’ questions and make predictions. But 
she does need to surround herself with people who do. 
Former President Jean-Claude Juncker’s Chief of Staff, 
Martin Selmayr, actively used the in-house think tank, 
European Political Strategy Centre (EPSC), together with 
the 2700-strong Joint Research Centre, to confront the 
Commission’s leadership with new ideas. In contrast, von 
der Leyen’s Head of Cabinet, Bjoern Seibert, shut the EPSC 
down and runs its replacement small-scale presidential 
advisory service, I.D.E.A., as a tight operation closed in on 
itself, with no organisation chart made public to date.
Instead, foresight in the Commission has been put under 
the stewardship of the experienced Vice-President, 
Maroš Šefčovič. Despite only having half a unit in the 
Commission’s Secretariat-General to support the work, 
the 2021 Strategic Foresight Report published earlier 
this month is uplifting in its willingness to engage with 
the uncertainties, risks and opportunities ahead and 
identify areas for action.8 However, the jury is still out on 
whether the von der Leyen Commission has lost, rather 
than built, independent thought and foresight capacity. 
Just as the true value and ultimate proof of foresight are 
in proposing choices and actions, the real challenge lies 
in the difficult decision of bringing new policy based on 
anticipation to the political agenda.
Šefčovič’s report illustrates this predicament. This 
summer’s hot topic, climate adaption, now stands out as 
an obvious area of relative neglect and underinvestment. 
While it might be uncomfortable in the lead-up to the UN 
Climate Change Conference in November, Europe should 
now, sadly, anticipate a collective failure in limiting 
global warming to 1.5 or 2 degrees Celsius, as the report 
goes some way to suggest. This dramatic scenario must 
now be systematically built into European policymaking, 
leading to decade-long preparation efforts for major 
disruptions that go far beyond the Commission’s lifeless 
Adaptation Strategy from 24 February. 
This summer’s hot topic, climate adaption, 
now stands out as an obvious area of 
relative neglect and underinvestment.
But what about when ‘what if’ scenarios go against 
the grain of institutionally established thinking and 
policy? The Commission’s current projected path to 
zero emissions is strongly premised on the idea that 
in less than a decade, renewables and clean hydrogen 
technologies will make up a significant portion of Europe’s 
energy balance. Although this could prove true, it is by no 
means a forgone conclusion. Just as the investment paths 
and take-up of heavy industries are difficult to foresee, 
there are also alternative technologies, such as nuclear 
energy and carbon capture, that hold promise for the 
future, as Šefčovič’s report mentions (albeit laconically). 
Will the Commission follow up on the 2020 strategies on 
offshore renewable energy and hydrogen with politically 
more difficult or speculative nuclear investment and 
carbon capture and removal strategies? Such questions are 
where foresight and risk-taking now meet policy choices 
in von der Leyen’s Commission. 
Can the EU deal with the political fall-out from 
uncertainty, shocks and change?
Europe’s volatile politics is likely the biggest challenge 
President von der Leyen faces, partly because it largely 
escapes her control. In an ever-moving world, centrifugal 
forces become stronger. Popular fall-out over migration 
and foreign policy pressures, rule-of-law challenges, 
and the transformational politics of climate action and 
technology are inevitable. But if it were to get out of 
hand, Europe would be ungovernable. That is why  
von der Leyen must up her game in Europe’s big politics. 
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Take migration: human movement is hard to model,9 
but swelling pressures – from climate change, natural 
disasters, demographic changes, economic development 
and conflict in our near and far neighbourhoods – is 
a dramatic reality of decades to come.10 And there is 
frightfully little Europe can do. So far, Europe’s centre 
has largely favoured (or paid lip service to) a welcoming 
stance, often at the expense of Europe’s periphery. The 
thousands of Afghan refugees sent home ‘safely’ in recent 
years underlines the extent of this hypocrisy. Now, fragile 
domestic politics point to restrictive policies across 
Europe. But as the years since 2015 have shown, the cost 
of finding common EU ground will be high. 
More than ever, President von der Leyen 
and her European Council counterpart, 
Charles Michel, must step up and show 
that they can build unity in views 
and action. Regretfully, rather than 
cooperating, an unhealthy relationship 
of suspicion and rivalry has developed 
between the two over the past months.
More than ever, President von der Leyen and her 
European Council counterpart, Charles Michel, must 
step up and show that they can build unity in views and 
action. Long gone is the time when Franco–German 
compromise was a complete and sufficient answer 
to problems on the EU agenda. As Chancellor Angela 
Merkel bows out of politics11 and President Emmanuel 
Macron fights for re-election, von der Leyen and Michel 
lose their mentors and must fill the power vacuum they 
leave behind. Regretfully, rather than cooperating, an 
unhealthy relationship of suspicion and rivalry has 
developed between the two over the past months.12 Such 
conflict undermines the member states’ confidence and 
inevitably leads to more intergovernmental reflexes in 
European capitals.
True, the Treaty of Lisbon is messy, providing only 
a notional hierarchy that needs to be worked out in 
practice.13 But wait not for an undependable Conference 
on the Future of Europe to clear that up. Ahead of her 
State of the Union speech, von der Leyen would do well 
to call across the street to put any remaining differences 
to rest. Both teams work for Europe, and there should be 
enough work for everyone. A solid working relationship 
and a clear, practical division of tasks – not least on the 
international scene where Europe’s uneasy, bicephalous 
leadership has been most damaging – is the minimum to 
be achieved.
The importance of new inter-institutional politics also 
goes deeper. As part of his ambition to lead a ‘political 
Commission’, Juncker, von der Leyen’s predecessor, 
sought to position the Commission as the EU’s 
‘barycentre’ and agenda-setter. He encountered both 
success and failure.14 On Brexit, the Commission, by 
and large, commanded the member states’ attention 
and set the agenda. In other priority areas, such as 
deepening the eurozone and asylum and migration 
policy, new initiatives never got off the ground. The 
reasons are certainly complex but came down, in part, 
to method. Ahead of any proposal or negotiation stance, 
EU Brexit negotiator Michel Barnier’s team deployed 
unprecedented efforts to process the national and the 
European Parliament’s interests at both the political  
and technical levels.
Sceptics might argue that if applied to law-making, the 
‘Barnier method’15 would go against the grain of the 
Commission’s prerogatives and power of initiative. But 
that is a misreading of the EU’s complex institutional 
structure and the demands of today’s politics. At a 
moment when the Union needs a powerful engine, 
the Commission must realise that it will not play that 
role unless it overhauls its inter-institutional working 
methods. Major transformative projects, such as the 
Green Deal and the digital transition, should be co-
constructed across institutions, from inception to 
adoption, through dedicated structures and processes in 
the Council and the European Parliament. Unfortunately, 
institutional innovation is not the path taken by the 
current EU leadership. As the massive and decisive  
‘Fit for 55’ package16 now risks becoming a slow, bruising 
battle between member states, and with Parliament,  
that might have been short-sighted. 
Major transformative projects, such as 
the Green Deal and the digital transition, 
should be co-constructed across 
institutions, from inception to adoption, 
through dedicated structures and 
processes in the Council and the European 
Parliament.
Such topics – upon which Europe’s future depends – 
are inevitably Chefsache in the capitals. To help build 
legitimacy and ownership, the Commission President 
should now use the possibility to place lead Vice-
Presidents or Commissioners next to herself at the 
European Council, as both Juncker and von der Leyen 
did for Barnier during the Brexit discussions. Given the 
bumpy road ahead on climate action, First Vice-President 
Frans Timmermans should be assigned this ‘Barnier seat’. 
The High Representative/Vice-President (HRVP) already 
has this European Council seat by virtue of TEU Article 15. 
Far from a diminishment of the President, Timmerman’s 
new seat would be a sign of with-it management and 
team play. 
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All things considered, von der Leyen’s strongest card 
is concrete, positive politics and open, on-the-ground 
engagement with her full team. Towards member states, 
whose oppositions and foot-dragging should not be 
presumed if offered the opportunity of sincere dialogue. 
And towards citizens and voters, whose views should not 
be reduced to those of their leaders – especially when 
some of the latter undermine the rule of law or peddle 
culture wars. The backsliding on fundamental democratic 
standards in Hungary and Poland is a major challenge 
for the cohesion and future of the European project. 
When push now comes to shove with the withholding of 
European funds, von der Leyen must spearhead efforts to 
reconnect with European citizens across the deepening 
East-West divide. 
The backsliding on fundamental democratic 
standards in Hungary and Poland is a major 
challenge for the cohesion and future of the 
European project. When push now comes 
to shove with the withholding of European 
funds, von der Leyen must spearhead 
efforts to reconnect with European citizens 
across the deepening East-West divide. 
The Conference on the Future of Europe stands as an 
interesting experiment in citizens’ participation that 
can apply vital pressure on and test function the EU’s 
political agenda. Politicians in Brussels would do well 
to take the Conference more seriously, to re-engage 
with popular frustrations and recognise that citizens 
– and even Eurosceptics – have valid arguments.17 The 
Green Deal and the digital transition will require a 
“breathtakingly bold” transformation of our societies 
with consequences, big and small, on our everyday 
lives.18 These consequences must be brought out in the 
open and discussed. Soaring electricity prices or the 
loss of jobs in particular sectors of our economy might 
quickly become the signal of not only change but also of 
potential social unrest. If the economic redistribution 
inherent in climate change policies and the concerns of 
marginal constituencies are not better addressed, the 
dual green and digital transition will not succeed.19
Ultimately, solid EU policies and politics are what will 
bring citizens onboard. In today’s world of shocks and 
changes, von der Leyen will also have to make up for 
her hasty and empty talk of a ‘geopolitical Commission’. 
On the global stage, the EU should be a force for good; 
it should not pretend to be a force it is not. In concrete 
terms, von der Leyen’s Commission must step up again 
its leadership in organising global vaccine deliveries. 
The long-haul and difficult issue of European defence 
is also an underexploited and mobilising project that 
EU citizens recognise. Without it, Europe will disappear 
geopolitically.20 As Washington once again shows little 
concern for the consequences of its actions in Europe’s 
uncertain neighbourhood, European interests might 
now overlap more than in the past. As such, defence 
could hold the key to Europe’s difficult political equation 
between Western Europe on the one hand, and Central 
and Eastern Europe on the other, which is in dire need  
of a positive narrative.
Is the Commission’s executive structure tailored to 
deliver the major tasks it faces? 
The pandemic has been a magnifying glass on this 
Commission’s strengths and weaknesses, on both 
political and technical levels. With no prior head-of-
government nor Commission experience, von der Leyen 
has manifestly felt the need to establish presidential 
authority. Yet, contrary to what her closest circle might 
think, since the 10-year tenure of President Jacques 
Delors, and despite the Commission’s decision-making  
de jure remaining collegial, the main challenge in running 
the Commission is not establishing presidential image 
nor authority. It is in corralling the College into a strong 
and accountable executive based on efficient teamwork 
and good allocation of resources.
Von der Leyen’s highly mediatised visit to the Pfizer 
Global Manufacturing site in Belgium this April stands 
as a low point due to the lack of team spirit it projected. 
However, it also marked a possible turning point in her 
leadership. The solo visit did little to cover the mess 
and disappointments over her direct management of 
vaccine procurement, despite several calls to big pharma 
CEOs throughout winter 2020.21 But it also highlighted 
what works. A few months earlier, Internal Market 
Commissioner Breton had been given direct responsibility 
for a task force to increase industrial vaccine production 
in Europe. It was he who enlisted dozens of manufacturing 
sites across Europe and contracted the 1.8 billion Pfizer 
doses von der Leyen went to showcase that day.
Those early months of the pandemic provide lessons 
in not only anticipation and leadership but also in the 
changing needs and demands on the Commission. 
Europe is increasingly facing cross-border public goods 
problems that national administrations are incapable 
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of handling and that EU institutions are not designed 
to solve.22 Vaccine purchases and EU-level intervention 
to unblock supply bottlenecks is just the latest example 
of the Commission’s progressive transformation into 
an administrative machine that is expected to deliver 
complex services directly on the ground.  
Vaccine purchases and EU-level 
intervention to unblock supply  
bottlenecks is just the latest example  
of the Commission’s progressive 
transformation into an administrative 
machine that is expected to deliver 
complex services directly on the ground. 
EU structures like rescEU, Europol and Frontex are now 
part of Europe’s frontline, delivering civil protection, law 
enforcement capacities and border management. This is 
a step change in how the Union operates and will entail, 
over the years, a significant reform of the Commission.  
As these agencies develop their powers and on-the-
ground presence further, political responsibility must also 
follow suit. Currently, only 2 out of 34 members on the 
Frontex Management Board are from the Commission. 
Yet, von der Leyen would do well to consider who is 
politically responsible and would have to stand before  
the Parliament if anything were to go seriously wrong  
in an operation.
Frontex’s governance model highlights the broader point 
that the Commission – like the EU as a whole – remains 
an unfinished construction. It is yet to find its full role 
and the balance between its capacities as an executive 
and its political accountability. In effect, establishing a 
hierarchy with clear lines of responsibility for multiple 
interconnected missions, to make the executive as 
efficient and publicly accountable as possible, is von der 
Leyen’s most important prerogative. It is also a challenge 
with which most Commission Presidents have grappled.23 
Von der Leyen’s College has potential, with many strong 
personalities and seasoned politicians. If organised 
well, her Vice-Presidents could be trusted lieutenants 
who ensure political balance and accountability and 
help deliver coherent common priorities through 
Commissioners’ groups. Yet, there is little evidence that 
she manages to share leadership effectively with her 
three executive Vice-Presidents, relying instead on a thin 
inner circle of advisers. The complex structure she has 
established – three Executive Vice-Presidents, five Vice-
Presidents and six Commissioners’ groups –24 complicates 
the division of tasks and responsibility across the layer of 
titles further.  
Most Brussels observers would be hard-pressed to 
provide a clear answer on who, for example, leads the 
EU’s digital initiatives. Insiders suggest that many 
Commissioners’ groups do not function well, with too 
many crossed wires and unclear missions. Rather than 
ensuring project coordination, Vice-Presidents often have 
significant portfolios of their own to guard, such as trade 
or competition. Or, they act like roving Pac-Men looking 
for PR opportunities in the portfolios of others. What 
is more, the President’s cabinet frequently intervenes 
in individual files, effectively undermining the Vice-
Presidents’ capacity to coordinate and direct.
In a big executive, the President must make clear what 
she directs and what she delegates. All too often, she has 
been guilty of seeking the limelight of her lieutenants. It 
is not surprising that the crucial health portfolio landed 
on her desk amid COVID-19. But that this big topic fell 
between the chairs of different Vice-Presidents and 
Commissioners’ groups; that she ended up overstretched; 
and that vaccine procurement firefighting was lumped 
on one of the College’s busiest Commissioners who 
already covers the digital, industry, defence and Single 
Market files are signs of structural weakness. Outward 
communication has also been a challenge, with both a 
pattern of overpromising and underdelivering, and a 
tendency to claim merit for successful initiatives and 
shirk responsibility for errors made.
There are also problems further down in von der Leyen’s 
executive. Overall, Commission employees form a modern 
and efficient cadre of highly motivated civil servants.25 
As Brexit highlighted, despite its 32,000+ headcount, the 
Commission’s staff numbers are rather modest in relation 
to national administrations and its tasks at hand. But 
all is not well. Pay structures and privileges that do not 
square with the public’s expectations towards a modern 
civil service remain as a generous legacy from a different 
era. Often eager to clip the wings of the Commission, 
member states have seized on this to exert pressure on 
the EU’s administrative expenditures, leading to a 5% 
staffing reduction pledge.  
In some Directorates-General,  
an unsustainable workload verges  
on irresponsibility and puts the  
Commission’s ability to deliver  
on fundamental priorities at risk.
In some Directorates-General (DGs), an unsustainable 
workload verges on irresponsibility and puts the 
Commission’s ability to deliver on fundamental priorities 
at risk.26 Key departments working on the Green Deal are 
among the Commission’s smallest and extremely modest 
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in light of the objectives set for what is one of the EU’s 
largest regulatory programmes ever. DG Environment has 
a headcount of 439, and DG Climate Action merely 225. 
By comparison, DG International Partnerships (formerly 
Development and Cooperation) has a total legacy 
headcount of over 2,900.27
At best, gaps in delivery are compensated by the 
Commission’s steadily growing and all-powerful 
Secretariat-General, but with the knock-on effect of 
shortcutting both technical expertise and the portfolio 
Commissioners. At worst, the Commission leaves 
itself exposed to faulty groundwork and/or regulatory 
capture. At this point, as the Commission adjusts its 
working practices to the post-pandemic realities, both 
the structure of the Commission’s staffing policies and a 
more effective redeployment of resources to the frontline 
DGs merits the President’s attention. DG Communication 
is another standout case in need of fundamental reform 
to deliver more targeted presence and messaging on the 
ground in member states, rather than the current over-
centralised communication. 
All in all, running a ‘big government’ at a time of major 
global transitions is not an easy job. As she now plans 
for the post-pandemic world, von der Leyen should 
reconsider how to deliver on her Commission’s missions 
and priorities. There is not much time and available 
resources for organisational change. The starting point 
should therefore be the main tasks her Commission 
must deliver in the next three years. With today’s pace 
of change, much speaks for not setting new and rigid 
structures identifying clearly articulated missions and 
responsibilities to deliver instead.
Experimentation often holds the key to success. A light 
organisational structure, under the dual leadership of 
a politician and a high-level civil servant, with direct 
access to top staff and resources across the Commission 
to solve a specific problem28 proved its worth in the Brexit 
negotiations and could be tested again. Climate adaption 
or other urgencies within the Green Deal, the development 
of tech ecosystems and even EU–China relations29 could 
be compelling cases for this task force model. 
A precondition for the success of this method remains, 
however, that the member states accept that the 
Commission takes the lead. But with regards to China, 
they should recognise that neither HRVP Josep Borrell nor 
Trade Commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis have the time 
nor focus to deal with the multiform challenges it poses. 
A task force that reports directly to the President, HRVP 
and College while crucially also intensively processing the 
political interests of the member states and Parliament 
could be a milestone in the delivery of von der Leyen’s 
promise of a ‘geopolitical Commission’. 
Conclusion and recommendations 
Overpromising and underdelivering is a common, and 
often fatal, political error. On the basis of the ambitions 
she laid out at the outset,30 it also stands out as a risk to 
von der Leyen’s Commission at the halfway mark of her 
mandate. In addition, bold claims like the President’s 
“Europe will be what we want it to be” easily have a 
hollow ring, considering the pace of change in today’s 
world. But if what she means to say is that our future 
starts at home and lies increasingly with her own 
executive, she is right.31  
After almost two years of fighting  
crises, now is the time for her 
administration to reset, regroup and get 
things done in the final years of her term.
After almost two years of fighting crises, now is the 
time for her administration to reset, regroup and get 
things done in the final years of her term (before the 
political calendar and wish for a second mandate steal 
the focus and attention). Europe’s policy agenda must 
continue to evolve, but in broad terms, the priorities 
set at the beginning of her mandate still stand the test 
of time. Without making significant structural changes 
that would sap resources from an already constrained 
administration, von der Leyen must now focus her 
Commission on the means of delivery. 
The following five recommendations outline what 
von der Leyen should do to improve her leadership and 
administration within the current legal and institutional 
framework and complete the mandate assigned to her by 
Europe’s leaders and the European Parliament:
1.  Establish independent thought and foresight, 
capable of challenging established ideas and 
structures, at the heart of the Commission’s 
leadership and policy agenda. ‘New’ key policy 
questions that von der Leyen should address in 
her State of the Union speech range from climate 
adaptation, demography and migration to investment 
in skills, tech, defence; and engaging Europeans in 
democratic renewal.
2.  Clarify responsibilities over priority deliveries in 
the next three years within the College, including 
her own working relationship and shared leadership 
with the (Executive) Vice-Presidents. Commissioners’ 
10
groups should be streamlined according to (new) 
priorities, and Commissioners should receive updated 
mission letters. 
3.  Rethink the inter-institutional cooperation on 
major transformative EU projects, such as the  
Green Deal and digital transition, which must be  
co-constructed across institutions, from inception to 
adoption, through dedicated structures and processes. 
The Green Deal has so far been a missed opportunity in 
this regard. To better process member states’ political 
concerns, von der Leyen and Michel should offer 
Timmermans the Barnier seat at the European Council. 
Timmermans should then embark on an intensive 
‘capital city’ tour with key staff and initiate an informal 
‘Green Deal delivery task force’ with the upcoming 
Council Presidencies and European Parliament.
4.  Experiment further with the task force model, 
relying on the dual leadership of a politician and a 
high-level civil servant that are given direct access 
to top staff and resources across the Commission to 
solve a specific mission. Climate adaption, alternative 
strategies of decarbonisation (e.g. carbon capture and 
removal technologies), the development of European 
tech ecosystems, and even EU–China relations could 
be compelling case studies for experimentation.
5.  Provide immediate remedy to resource allocation 
problems in overburdened DGs and enact a proper 
reform of staffing policies. Reforming outdated pay  
and privileges structures within the EU’s civil service 
stands as a necessary trade-off for member states  
to understand the resource needs of a growing 
Commission.
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